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Abstract
The paper uses different measures of financial sector development for a dynamic heterogeneous
panel of 17 African countries to examine the impact of financial sector development on private
savings. An innovative econometric methodology is also employed related to a series of
cointegration tests within a panel. This is an important contribution since traditional panel data
analysis adopted in previous studies suffers from serious heterogeneity bias problems. The
empirical results obtained vary considerably among countries in the panel, thus highlighting the
importance of using different measures of financial sector development rather than a single
indicator. The evidence is rather inconclusive, although in most of the countries in the sample a
positive relationship between financial sector development and private savings seems to hold.
The empirical analysis also suggests that a change in government savings is offset by an
opposite change in private savings in most of the countries in the panel, thus confirming the
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Liquidity constraints do not seem to play a vital role in most
of the African countries in the group, since the relevant coefficient is negative and significant in
only a small group of countries.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in the role of the financial sector in
economic development.1 In the aftermath of the financial crises of 1997–98, it is
becoming increasingly clear that a sound understanding of the interaction between
financial structure and domestic and international finance is vital for economic growth
and long-term prosperity. Contrary, however, to a vast and increasing literature on
financial sector development and growth, little has been written on the important
relationship between financial structure and savings mobilization.2 The above clearly
calls for further research on this important issue.3
Quite suprisingly, the significant nexus of financial sector reforms and savings
mobilization has not been explored empirically for the African region so far, given the
overall low savings rates of many African economies in recent years and the fact that a
substantial number of African countries have undertaken a series of financial reforms
recently to improve economic performance.4
Most African countries often lack an appropriate financial sector, which provides
incentives for individuals to save and acts as an efficient intermediary to convert these
savings into credit for borrowers. The financial liberalization experience of many
African economies in recent years, although towards the right direction in many cases,
seems to suggest that changing the financial structure of an economy is a complicated
process which assumes a deep understanding of the entire set of interactions between
financial sector reforms and the economy. At the same time, the recent experience of the
Asian financial crisis clearly suggests that whilst financial liberalization may be
desirable, the process must be correctly regulated (Stiglitz 1999, Brownbridge and
Kirkpatrick 1999).
In view of the above, the present paper contributes to the relevant literature in four
important respects:
i)  On the modelling front, we use a new version of the extended life-cycle model
of savings behaviour proposed by Modigliani (1990) and extended by Jappelli
and Pagano (1994) to allow for liquidity constraints; this is now further
modified to include various measures of financial sector development as
determinants of private savings.
ii)  We focus on a selected group of 17 African countries (purely determined on
the basis of data availability) to shed light, on the relationship between
                                                
1 See Arestis and Demetriades (1997) for an excellent assessment of the literature.
2 Among the few exemptions are the study by Bandiera et al. (2000), which, by using data on a selected
group developing countries has concluded that financial sector development does not necessarily raise
private saving, and Kelly and Mavrotas (2001), which shows a rather strong positive impact of
different financial sector development indicators on private savings in India over the period 1972–97.
3 For a critical review of the relevant literature see Mavrotas and Kelly (2001a).
4 A recent study on Zambia has shown that financial sector reforms were unable to boost savings due,
inter alia, to poor design and inappropriate regulation (Maimbo and Mavrotas 2001).2
financial sector development and savings mobilization in the African region
for the first time in the relevant literature.
iii)  Our database, recently constructed by the World Bank and described in detail
in Loayza et al. (1998), is a clear departure from existing databases on savings
by representing the largest macroeconomic data set on saving and related
variables; the data has been subject to extensive consistency checks which
resulted in a high quality savings data as opposed to the case of conventional
data sets which suffer from serious limitations and constraints. Furthermore,
we use three different measures of financial sector development to assess the
potential differential impact of each measure on private savings behaviour in
the above group of African countries.
iv)  Finally, on the econometric front, we employ an innovative panel cointegration
approach, never used before in empirical studies of savings behaviour for
developing countries, so that reliable evidence is derived. Our econometric
methodology, based on recently developed panel cointegration and integration
tests, allows, inter alia, for complete heterogeneity in dynamic panel data
analysis – an issue that has been neglected in cross-section and panel data
studies of savings behaviour of both developing and industrial countries.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we discuss modelling issues
and section 3 deals with data issues. Section 4 focuses on the measurement of financial
sector development, followed by section 5, which discusses econometric methodology
issues and empirical findings. The last section concludes the paper.
2 The model
The paper uses the modified life-cycle model of saving behaviour proposed by
Modigliani (1990) and extended by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) for estimation. This
model was used by Sarantis and Stewart (2000) to test saving behaviour in OECD
countries. We modify this model further by including various measures of financial
sector development as determinants of private savings behaviour.
The model takes the form:
PSAVt = a0 + a1PCREDt + a2GOVSAVt + a3RGPDIt + a4FSDxt + et
Where PSAVt is the private saving rate, PCREDt denotes the liquidity constraint,
GOVSAVt is the rate of government saving, RGPDIt measures real gross personal
disposable income per capita, and FSDxt is an appropriate measure of financial sector
development, as discussed below.
The inclusion of the liquidity constraint variable in the above model reflects the
criticism of the extended Modigliani’s model (1990) by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) as
being unable to address issues of liquidity constraints in savings behaviour under
                                                
5 A notable exemption is a recent study by Sarantis and Stewart (2000) which uses panel cointegration
tests to derive the long-run determinants of savings in OECD countries.3
conditions of imperfect capital markets. The rationale in this case is that the easing of
liquidity constraints may discourage private savings. The government saving variable in
the model captures Ricardian equivalence effects along the lines of Barro (1974) and
Feldstein (1982), who suggest that, under Ricardian equivalence, public debt issues are
macroeconomically indistinguishable from tax increases, and thus a change in public
saving should be offset by an equal and opposite change in private saving. We also
employ gross private disposable income to capture traditional income effects as being
more appropriate than using gross national disposable income or GDP, both of which
have been used extensively in the past, as we are examining the private saving rate,
rather than national or aggregate savings.
3 Data issues
Data for private saving is expressed as a percentage of gross private disposable income
(GPDI). Private saving is calculated on the basis of the consolidated central government
(CCG) definition of the public sector; this data is obtained from the World Bank saving
database (see Loayza et al. (1998) for further details).6 Calculation of GPDI was
performed as outlined below.
RGPDI refers to the log of real GPDI per capita. This is calculated by subtracting CCG
saving and CCG consumption from gross national disposable income (GNDI). These
data are all obtained from the World Bank saving database. Real GPDI is obtained by
dividing GPDI by CPI. To get RGPDI per capita, real GPDI is divided by population.
Finally, to express this in a common currency (US$) real GPDI per capita is divided by
the World Bank Atlas conversion factor.
Government saving (GOVSAV) is taken from the World Bank saving database. This is
CCG saving, consistent with private saving above, and is expressed as a percentage of
GNDI.
The private credit (PCRED) data refers to financial resources provided to the private
sector – such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and
other accounts receivable – that establish a claim for repayment. This measure is
expressed as a percentage of GDP. The private credit data comes from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (1999).
The span of the data varies. When undertaking panel integration testing, the longest
available time series for each variable for each country was used. The longest data span
was 1960–1997 (38 years); the shortest was 15 years. For the panel cointegration tests,
the span was determined by the shortest span for an individual variable in a particular
country. Given that data on private saving was only available to 1994 (see World Bank
                                                
6 The CCG definition of the public sector used in the World Bank Database comprises budgetary
central government plus extra budgetary central government plus social security agencies. Essentially,
CCG is equivalent to general government minus local and regional governments. The CCG definition
defines public savings as inclusive of all net transfers from abroad. In view of the above, private
savings = gross national saving – public sector saving. Note that as the CCG definition is used, private
saving will include the saving of both local government and public enterprises (Loayza et al. 1998).4
database), this provided an upper limit. Generally, most countries had data from 1972 to
1994; however, in some cases this was reduced.
There are a number of potential determinants of private saving that have not been
included in the above specification, such as the rate of interest, and demographic
variables such as the dependency ratio. The exclusion of some determinants is
unavoidable due to the degrees of freedom available, on account of the short time series
availability. The decision regarding which variables to include was based on a trade-off
of the hypotheses we wished to test. Some may regard the exclusion of the rate of
interest as remiss; however, the ambiguity of the results obtained by other authors in the
past (see, for example, Bandiera et al. 2000) led us to exclude this variable. Similarly,
the decision to exclude demographic variables was taken because these are generally
treated as weakly exogenous, and so are of limited interest to our study.
4 Measures of financial sector development
Measuring financial sector development is a rather complicated procedure since there
are no concrete definitions as to what financial development is. As argued quite rightly
by Bandiera et al. (2000) an ideal index of financial sector development should attempt
to measure both the various aspects of the deregulatory and the institution-building
process in financial sector development. However, measuring the above aspects is a
difficult if not impossible task.7 A number of measures of financial sector development
have been suggested in the recent past. In the present paper we use measures suggested
by Beck et al. (1999b), given in their database on Financial Development and Structure.
The database unites a wide variety of indicators that measure size, activity and efficiency
of financial intermediaries and markets. Some selectivity has been exercised in choosing
which measures to employ since some are more applicable than others for the particular
group of countries we are examining.
A general finding is that central banks lose relative importance as one moves from low
to high-income countries, and other financial institutions gain relative importance. Thus
a measure of relative size of financial intermediaries is a useful indicator of
development. Beck et al. (1999a) disaggregate total financial assets into central bank
assets, deposit money bank assets and other financial institutions assets, and propose 3
measures, each of which presents the respective asset class as a percentage of total
financial assets. Given the lack of disaggregated data for some of the countries under
consideration, we use a broader measure that measures the relative importance of
deposit money banks relative to central banks, a measure that has been used as a
measure of financial development by, inter alia, King and Levine (1993 a,b), and
Levine et al. (1999). This measure is denoted FSD1.
Absolute size of the financial sector to GDP is a useful measure of financial depth,
which represents the level of development of the financial sector. We use a measure of
absolute size based on liabilities, as proposed by Beck et al. (1999a). This is liquid
liabilities to GDP, which equals currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of
                                                
7 See Bandiera et al. (2000) for an excellent discussion of previous studies tried to quantify the effects
of financial sector development on savings.5
banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. It is the broadest available
indicator of financial intermediation, as it includes all three of the financial sectors
outlined above. This measure is denoted FSD2.
The above measures do not distinguish whether the claims of financial intermediaries
are on the public sector or the private sector. It is useful to have an indicator that
concentrates on claims on the private sector. Beck et al. (1999a) propose a measure of
private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. This
measure isolates credit issued to the private sector, and concentrates on credit issued by
intermediaries other than the central bank. This measure has been used by Levine et al.
(1999) and Beck et al. (1999a). We denote this measure FSD3.
5 Econometric methodology and empirical findings
This paper employs the most recent panel integration and cointegration tests for a group
of 17 African countries to look at the long run determinants of private saving. The
countries used in the panel are selected entirely on the basis of data availability. These
countries are listed in the Appendix.
Use of panel unit root and cointegration tests enable one to determine the long run
structure of savings in a dynamic setting, avoiding the well known problems involved in
using static cointegration testing, and the problems of the sensitivity of cointegration
tests to low-powered stationarity tests involved in time series analysis. Most
importantly, these innovative panel data techniques allow for heterogeneity in
coefficients and dynamics across countries, and allow one to test directly for the
existence of long run equilibrium saving functions.
5.1 Testing for stationarity in panel data
As with standard cointegration tests it is important to know the stationarity properties of
the data to ensure that incorrect inferences are not made. Testing for stationarity in
panel data differs somewhat from conducting unit root tests in standard individual time
series; these differences will be discussed in what follows.
The simplest panel unit root tests can be attributed to Levin and Lin (1993). These tests
allow for fixed effects and unit specific time trends in addition to common time trends.
Incorporating a degree of heterogeneity in this manner is important as the coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable is restricted to be homogenous across all units of the
panel. The authors prescribe the use of augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests to test for
unit roots.
In this paper we follow the methodology of Sarantis and Stewart (2000) by using two
recently developed tests for dynamic heterogenous panels. Im et al. (1997) modify
Levin and Lin’s framework by allowing for heterogeneity of the coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable. The authors propose the use of a group-mean Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) statistic to test for the null that the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable is equal to zero across all members of the panel. Standard ADF regressions are
estimated and the LM statistic is computed. In simplistic terms, one calculates a statistic
termed the t-bar statistic by the authors; this is based on the average of the augmented6
Dickey Fuller t-statistics for individual countries. The authors have computed critical
values for the components of their tests by using stochastic simulations, and they show
that the t-bar statistic converges to a standard normal distribution as the number of
countries and the number of observations tends to infinity.
In view of the above, the statistic is calculated as follows:
i i i b a p }/ ] − ) ( = N[t {     ψ
Where t is the average of the N individual country ADF t-statistics, with lag orders p,
and ai and bi are respectively the expected mean and variance of the individual country
ADF statistics, ti.8
The statistic ψ  converges to a standard normal distribution as T, N ∼   ∞ , so the
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected or not depending on comparing the value
obtained to the standard normal critical values.
Maddala and Wu (1999) focus on the shortcomings of both the Levin and Lin (1993)
and Im et al. (1997) frameworks. In particular, they focus on the difficulties inherent in
the Im et al. tests. These are discussed in Banerjee (1999); they include the assumption
that the panels are balanced, which is frequently not the case in practice. Also, in
common with Levin and Lin, the critical values are sensitive to the choice of lag lengths
in the ADF regressions. Maddala and Wu (1999) proposed a more straightforward, non-
parametric unit root test. This is given by:
where  i π  are the probabilities of the test statistic for a unit root in unit i, asymptotic
values of which were calculated using the programme apvals.exe, and λ  is distributed as
χ
2 with 2N degrees of freedom. Maddala and Wu show that their test dominates that of
Im et al. (1997) in that it has smaller size distortions and comparable power, and is
robust to statistic choice, lag length in the ADF regressions, and varying time
dimensions for each cross sectional unit.
Full results of the Im et al. (1997) and Maddala and Wu (1999) stationarity tests are
contained in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 respectively. With the exception of PSAV, the
variables are found to be I(1). In the case of PSAV, the Im et al. test rejects the null at
both the 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, suggesting that the PSAV series is stationary.
The Maddala and Wu test rejects the null at the 5 per cent level, but not at the 1 per cent
level. Given the low power of such stationarity tests, the evidence that PSAV may be
stationary is not a cause for concern.
                                                
8 The mean and variance are computed by Im et al. (1997) for different values of T and p by stochastic
simulations via 50,000 replications.
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5.2 Testing for cointegration in heterogenous panels
We use the Pedroni (1999) framework to test for cointegration. This formulation allows
one to investigate heterogeneous panels, in which heterogeneous slope coefficients,
fixed effects and individual specific deterministic trends are permitted. In its most
simple form, this consists of taking no cointegration as the null hypothesis and using the
residuals derived from the panel analogue of an Engle and Granger (1987) static
regression to construct the test statistic and tabulate the distributions.
The cointegration regression is given by:
Based on the cointegration residuals, Pedroni develops seven panel cointegration
statistics. The discussion and mathematical exposition of these statistics is contained in
Pedroni (1999), table 1. The asymptotic distributions of these panel cointegration
statistics are derived in Pedroni (1997). Under an appropriate standardization, based on
the moments of the vector of Brownian motion functionals, these statistics are
distributed as standard normal. The standardization is given by:
v ]/ N   -   [k     µ κ NT =
Pedroni (1999) gives critical values for µ and v with and without intercepts and
deterministic trends. The small sample size and power properties of all seven tests are
discussed in Pedroni (1997). He finds that size distortions are minor, and power is high
for all statistics when the time span is long. For shorter panels, the evidence is more
varied. However, in the presence of a conflict in the evidence provided by each of the
statistics, Pedroni shows that the group-adf statistic and panel-adf statistic generally
perform best.
The results of the Pedroni tests are given in Appendix Table 3. In the case of the system
including FSD1 as the measure of financial sector development, the null of no
cointegration was rejected by the panel pp statistic, the panel adf statistic and the group
adf statistic. It was not rejected by the other test statistics. When FSD2 was substituted
for FSD1, the same results were obtained. When FSD3 was used, the null of no
cointegration was also rejected by the group pp statistic. Given the above discussion
concerning the size distortions and power properties, we can conclude that the evidence
indicates the existence of cointegrating relationships.
Of course, while it is interesting to know that there are one or more long run
relationships in the non-stationary data, it is of more interest to discover the nature of
these relationships. Larsson et al. (1998) develop a test based on Johansen’s (1988)
multivariate cointegration framework. Given N countries with time dimension T, and a
set of p I(1) variables, the heterogeneous vector error-correction model is given by:
Where Y is a px1 vector of variables and the long run matrix Π is of order pxp. This
equation is estimated for each country N, using the maximum likelihood method, and
N. 1 i   T, 1   t            ...   t          S 1 1 i it … = … =   +     +   +   + + = it mit mi it i i X X ε β β δ α
N ...,             Y , ik 1 , i 1, =            + ∆ Γ + Π = ∆  − − i Y Y it k t i t i it ε8
the trace statistic is calculated. The null hypothesis to be tested is that all N countries
have the same number of cointegrating vectors (r) among the p variables. In other
words, H0: rank(Π) = ri < r, against the alternative hypothesis, H1: rank(Π) = p for all i =
1...N.
The panel cointegration rank trace test statistic, Y, is obtained by calculating the average
of the N individual trace statistics, LR, and then standardizing it as follows:
Where E(Z) and Var(Z) are, respectively, the mean and variance of the asymptotic trace
statistic, obtained from Larsson et al. (1998). This converges to a normal distribution
N(0,1). The results of the Larsson et al. tests are given in Appendix Tables 4–6 for
FSD1-FSD3 respectively. The tests indicate the existence of two cointegrating vectors
in each case. From theory, it seems likely that there will be a long run relationship
between PCRED and RGPDI. We impose this relationship in addition to a relationship
in which PSAV is normalized: Wald tests indicate that this is reasonable. We do not
report details of the cointegrating vector between PCRED and RGPDI as this is not of
relevance to the study.
5.3 Deriving the long-run equations
The next step is to examine the long-run determinants of private saving rates in
individual countries. These are obtained from a Johansen cointegration framework,9 and
are given in Appendix Tables 7–9, for FSD1-3 respectively. On account of the data span
limitations discussed above, we are restricted to using one lag, as including more lags
leads to determination problems. However, as we are using annual data, this is not
unreasonable.
The results, reported in Tables 7–9, seem to suggest a considerable variation among the
countries included in the panel in terms of the factors affecting private savings. When
the financial sector development indicator FSD1 is used (Table 7) the credit variable has
the expected negative sign in only 6 countries in the sample and is significant in only 3
of them, thus, not supporting Jappelli and Pagano’s view regarding the role of liquidity
constraints in savings behaviour. Turning to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, the
results seem to suggest a confirmation of the theory in 10 countries in the panel,
although significant coefficients are reported in only 6 of them. For the remaining
countries in the group the government savings coefficient has a positive sign. The
income variable, contrary to what is expected, has a negative sign in the majority of the
countries included in the group and the expected positive impact in only 5 of them. Of
crucial importance in the present study is the impact of financial sector development, as
measured by FSD1 in this case, on private savings. The results vary considerably. In 7
                                                
9 Sarantis and Stewart (2000) use the Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) methods, which
include leads and lags, in addition to the Johansen method to obtain long run saving equations. Such
methods have been shown to be preferable where estimation of a single cointegrating vector is of
concern (Maddala and Kim 1998). However, we do not use these methods as our model contains two
cointegrating vectors.
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countries the effect is positive and significant in 6 of them. For the remaining countries
the parameter is negative, thus indicating a discouraging effect on private savings.
Do the results change if we measure financial sector development in a different way? In
view of the results reported in Tables 8 and 9 (FSD2 and FSD3 respectively) the answer
is ‘partly, Yes’. More precisely, the results in Table 8 show that when a different
financial sector development indicator is used, in this case FSD2, financial sector
development has a clear positive impact on private savings in 11 countries in the sample
(and significant in 10 of them), thus confirming a priori expectations regarding the role
of financial sector in mobilizing savings. The use of FSD2 indicator does not seem to
affect the conclusions related to Ricardian equivalence. Indeed, in 11 countries in the
panel, the parameter is positive and significant (except in one case), suggesting that the
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis holds. Furthermore, the easing of liquidity constraints
does not seem to discourage private savings in most of the countries included in the
sample. Finally, income effects are positive in only 5 countries in the panel. In the case
of financial sector development indicator FSD3 employed in the present study (see
Table 9), the results are again mixed concerning the potential impact of finance on
savings. Financial sector development measured in terms of the activity of financial
intermediaries encourages private savings in 10 countries in the panel (though
significant in only 6 of them). For the rest the coefficient is negative. There is also
substantial variation in the case of government savings variable, given that now the
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis holds in only 7 countries. The liquidity constraints
effect as hypothesized by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) is rejected in 12 countries and is
confirmed in only 5 cases (though significant in 4). Disposable income affects savings
in a positive way in only 5 countries, thus casting doubts on the expected positive
impact of this variable on private savings for the majority of countries included in the
panel.
6 Concluding remarks
The present paper used panel integration and cointegration tests for a dynamic
heterogeneous panel of 17 African countries to examine the impact of financial sector
development on private savings. We used three different measures of financial sector
development to capture the variety of channels through which financial structure can
affect the domestic economy. The empirical results obtained vary considerably among
countries in the panel, thus highlighting the importance of using different measures of
financial sector development rather than a single indicator. The evidence is rather
inconclusive, although in most of the countries in the sample a positive relationship
between financial sector development and private savings seems to hold. The empirical
analysis seems also to suggest that a change in government savings is offset by an
opposite change in private savings in most of the countries in the panel, thus confirming
the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Liquidity constraints do not seem to play a vital
role in most of the African countries in the group, since the relevant coefficient is
negative and significant in only a small group of countries. Finally, a priori
expectations regarding the role of disposable income for private savings are not
confirmed. The above empirical findings regarding the impact of financial sector
variables on private savings are in line with results reported in Bandiera et al. (2000),
though for a different small group of countries and not in the context of panel
cointegration analysis.10
What are the tentative policy implications related to the above empirical findings? The
inconclusive evidence associated with the present study seems to suggest that the
financial reforms undertaken in many African countries in recent years and the existing
financial structure in many of them are not appropriate to mobilize private savings,
which is of crucial importance for achieving sustainable development and poverty-
reducing growth.10 Designing and implementing financial sector reforms cannot
guarantee savings mobilization in case policy makers are agnostic about the variety of
channels and mechanisms through which financial structure can affect savings and other
key macroeconomic variables. This raises significant policy issues. As a recent study
has put it:
… the importance of getting the big financial policy decisions right has
thus emerged as one of the central development challenges of the new
century. However, the controversy stirred up by the recent financial
crises has pointed to the weaknesses of doctrinaire policy views on how
this is to be achieved (my emphasis; World Bank 2001: 1).
Along these lines, strengthening the weak financial systems in the African region seems
to be of crucial significance, since advanced financial structures can contribute to long-
term prosperity. Improving the overall macroeconomic stability, the regulation and
supervision of local banks as well as the regulatory environment for micro-finance
institutions seem to be appropriate policy directions along with encouraging the
provision of savings facilities to micro, small and medium sized enterprises
(Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick 1999, Maimbo and Mavrotas 2001).
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Appendix Table 1: Im et al. (1997) test for stationarity
Note:  The critical values in all cases are –1.645 (5 per cent) and –2.326 (1 per cent); the sample period
for all cases is 1972–1997.
Im et al Panel Unit Root tests PSAV PCRED GOVSAV RGPDI FSD1 FSD2 FSD3
Botswana -1.840 -3.422 -1.656 -0.814 na -1.320 -2.497
Congo Rep. -2.643 39.010 -1.662 -1.428 -2.404 -1.928 -1.971
Côte d'Ivoire -1.664 -1.301 -1.615 -2.508 -0.768 -2.785 -1.554
Egypt -2.336 -1.567 -1.053 -2.877 -1.078 -0.898 -0.265
Gabon -2.548 -2.143 -1.240 -2.699 -2.127 -2.551 -2.480
Gambia -2.566 -1.259 -1.728 -1.633 -2.046 -2.429 -1.649
Ghana -2.979 -1.864 -1.121 -1.600 -3.096 -1.646 -1.644
Kenya -3.135 -2.281 -1.541 1.981 -1.647 -1.197 -0.796
Lesotho -1.305 0.252 -2.765 -2.639 -1.073 -0.903 -1.184
Madagascar -2.228 -2.068 -1.825 -1.352 -1.621 -3.608 -0.366
Morocco -1.904 -1.598 -1.272 -1.366 -1.945 0.870 -2.055
Niger -2.497 -1.316 -0.372 -2.403 -1.466 -1.688 -0.824
Rwanda -1.640 -1.948 -1.284 -2.199 -1.710 -1.769 -1.437
Senegal -1.449 -1.231 -2.602 -2.353 -0.967 -2.221 -1.690
Sierra Leone -0.412 -1.028 -2.525 0.967 -0.599 -0.986 -0.814
South Africa -2.155 2.289 -1.513 -1.815 -2.218 -1.454 -1.460
Swaziland -2.523 -1.798 -1.839 -3.203 -1.884 -1.106 -2.874
t-bar statistic -2.493 11.477 -0.893 -0.557 -0.631 -0.467 0.00014
Appendix Table 2: Maddala and Wu Panel Unit Root Test
Note: The test statistic is distributed as Chi squared, with 2N (34) degrees of freedom. The asymptotic 
values were calculated using the programme apvals.exe obtained from James MacKinnon’s
website (www.econ.queensu. ca/pub/faculty/mackinnon/jbes).
Appendix Table 3: Pedroni Test Results
Notes:
1. The cointegration tests were undertaken with different measures of financial sector development,
indicated by FSD1, FSD2 and FSD3.
2. Panel v is a nonparametric variance ratio statistic. Panel p and panel pp are analogous to the non-
parametric Phillips-Perron p and t statistics respectively. Panel adf is a parametric statistic based on
the augmented Dickey-Fuller ADF statistic. Group p is analogous to the Phillips-Perron p statistic.
Group pp and group adf are analogous to the Phillips-Perron t statistic and the augmented Dickey-
Fuller ADF statistic respectively.
3. The formulae for calculating these statistics can be found in Pedroni (1999) Table  1.
Madalla et al Panel Unit Root tests PSAV PCRED GOVSAV RGPDI FSD1 FSD2 FSD3
Botswana 0.361 0.010 0.454 0.815 na 0.620 0.116
Congo Rep. 0.084 0.999 0.451 0.569 0.141 0.319 0.299
Côte d'Ivoire 0.450 0.629 0.475 0.114 0.828 0.060 0.507
Egypt 0.161 0.500 0.733 0.048 0.724 0.789 0.930
Gabon 0.104 0.228 0.656 0.074 0.234 0.104 0.120
Gambia 0.100 0.648 0.417 0.466 0.267 0.134 0.458
Ghana 0.037 0.349 0.707 0.484 0.027 0.459 0.460
Kenya 0.024 0.178 0.513 0.999 0.459 0.675 0.820
Lesotho 0.627 0.975 0.063 0.085 0.726 0.787 0.680
Madagascar 0.196 0.258 0.368 0.605 0.472 0.006 0.916
Morocco 0.330 0.485 0.642 0.599 0.311 0.993 0.263
Niger 0.116 0.622 0.915 0.141 0.550 0.437 0.812
Rwanda 0.462 0.310 0.637 0.207 0.426 0.396 0.564
Senegal 0.559 0.660 0.093 0.155 0.765 0.199 0.436
Sierra Leone 0.908 0.743 0.110 0.994 0.871 0.758 0.815
South Africa 0.223 0.999 0.527 0.373 0.200 0.556 0.553
Swaziland 0.110 0.382 0.361 0.020 0.340 0.713 0.049
Test Statistic 56.437 31.731 31.889 47.727 32.851 40.229 30.441
Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test FSD1 FSD2 FSD3 CV
Panel v statistic -1.052 -1.050 0.911 1.64
Panel p statistic 1.020 0.907 -0.161 -1.64
Panel pp statistic -1.921 -1.747 -5.681 -1.64
Panel adf statistic -2.589 -1.694 -6.243 -1.64
Group p statistic 2.999 3.270 1.544 -1.64
Group pp statistic -1.479 -0.869 -7.061 -1.64
Group adf statistic -2.020 -1.813 -8.124 -1.6415
Appendix Table 4: Larsson et al. (1998) Panel Cointegration Test, FSD1
Notes:
1. Avg(Tr) is the average of the trace statistics for the individual countries.
2. E(Z) is the mean of the asymptotic trace statistic obtained from Larsson (1998).
3. Var(Z) is the variance of the asymptotic trace statistic obtained from Larsson (1998).
4. The statistic is normally distributed, and so the critical values are 1.645 (5 per cent) and 2.326 (1 per
cent).
5. On account of a lack of FSD1 data, there is no result for Botswana included in the above table.
FSD1 r=0 r=1 r=2 r=3 r=4 r
Congo Rep. 176.4 18.9 5.16 1.99 0.46 1
Côte d'Ivoire 65.1 35.0 19.4 6.90 0.02 1
Egypt 54.3 23.7 10.7 3.75 0.24 0
Gabon 69.0 25.9 8.65 3.41 0.03 1
Gambia 51.3 25.3 10.1 4.41 1.01 0
Ghana 46.8 26.3 13.1 4.16 0.20 0
Kenya 59.1 26.6 12.9 5.17 1.02 0
Lesotho 56.3 28.8 8.49 2.01 0.01 0
Madagascar 64.7 34.6 12.7 3.83 0.74 1
Morocco 65.0 31.9 16.6 5.22 0.31 1
Niger 83.7 46.2 19.3 7.36 1.02 2
Rwanda 46.6 26.8 10.1 5.05 1.05 0
Senegal 91.4 45.3 20.6 9.94 0.41 2
Sierra Leone 59.5 37.2 19.2 7.61 0.19 1
South Africa 92.4 38.2 14.5 5.09 1.89 1
Swaziland 87.1 46.8 20.0 9.28 0.08 2
Avg(Tr) 73.0 32.4 13.8
E(Z) 44.4 27.7 14.9
Var(Z) 71.2 44.3 25.8
Statistic 14.0 2.89 -0.8416
Appendix Table 5: Larsson et al. (1998) Panel Cointegration Test, FSD2
Notes:
1. Avg(Tr) is the average of the trace statistics for the individual countries.
2. E(Z) is the mean of the asymptotic trace statistic obtained from Larsson (1998).
3. Var(Z) is the variance of the asymptotic trace statistic obtained from Larsson (1998).
4. The statistic is normally distributed, and so the critical values are 1.645 (5 per cent) and 2.326 (1 per
cent).
5. On account of a lack of FSD2 data, there is no result for Lesotho included in the above table.
FSD2 r=0 r=1 r=2 r=3 r=4 r
Botswana 77.5 34.4 15.2 5.04 1.05 1
Congo Rep. 177.2 22.4 5.82 1.66 0.31 1
Côte d'Ivoire 63.3 38.1 19.3 3.55 1.06 1
Egypt 87.3 44.4 18.5 5.55 0.00 2
Gabon 77.8 35.2 17.7 3.81 0.38 1
Gambia 53.9 22.2 8.39 2.30 0.13 0
Ghana 74.7 33.2 18.0 8.17 0.40 1
Kenya 68.0 29.8 15.3 4.81 0.29 1
Madagascar 55.2 28.0 13.4 4.19 0.90 0
Morocco 71.8 34.6 19.2 6.46 0.30 1
Niger 54.0 28.8 15.7 5.49 0.86 0
Rwanda 49.4 24.5 11.6 5.39 0.17 0
Senegal 59.6 24.4 11.6 2.55 0.02 1
Sierra Leone 63.2 37.6 21.2 10.1 1.70 1
South Africa 100.0 46.9 23.4 6.41 0.21 2
Swaziland 92.4 52.1 19.1 4.22 1.11 2
Avg(Tr) 76.6 33.5 15.8
E(Z) 44.4 27.7 14.9
Var(Z) 71.2 44.3 25.8
Statistic 15.7 3.62 0.7917
Appendix Table 6: Larsson et al. (1998) Panel Cointegration Test, FSD3
Notes:
1. Avg(Tr) is the average of the trace statistics for the individual countries.
2. E(Z) is the mean of the asymptotic trace statistic obtained from Larsson (1998).
3. Var(Z) is the variance of the asymptotic trace statistic obtained from Larsson (1998).
4. The statistic is normally distributed, and so the critical values are 1.645 (5 per cent) and 2.326 (1 per
cent).
FSD3 r=0 r=1 r=2 r=3 r=4 r
Botswana 95.7 53.6 27.1 5.92 1.54 3
Congo Rep. 163.5 21.8 3.63 1.13 0.14 1
Côte d'Ivoire 77.5 32.3 16.2 7.47 2.63 1
Egypt 88.3 38.2 15.4 6.37 0.21 1
Gabon 82.5 34.1 12.3 1.32 0.04 1
Gambia 83.8 42.1 12.7 3.22 0.10 2
Ghana 106.9 42.1 16.2 4.17 0.22 2
Kenya 59.3 33.7 18.9 8.02 2.52 1
Lesotho 79.5 42.0 17.5 3.02 0.19 2
Madagascar 66.8 37.9 12.8 3.18 1.18 1
Morocco 64.2 32.4 16.0 7.41 0.30 1
Niger 76.0 35.2 13.9 3.29 0.80 1
Rwanda 96.8 34.8 17.1 8.01 1.13 1
Senegal 86.4 34.9 16.4 2.37 0.17 1
Sierra Leone 76.2 47.2 24.0 7.69 2.28 2
South Africa 74.9 27.2 21.6 8.61 0.93 1
Swaziland 67.3 39.9 19.7 8.67 0.37 2
Avg(Tr) 85.0 37.0 16.6
E(Z) 44.4 27.7 14.9
Var(Z) 71.2 44.3 25.8
Statistic 19.8 5.78 1.3818
Appendix Table 7: Long-run equations, using FSD1
Notes:
1. PSAV is normalized to equal 1.
2. Figures in italics are t-values.
3. Botswana is not included on account of lack of FSD1 data.
PSAV RGPDI GOVSAV PCRED FSD1
Congo 1 1.45 - - 0.58
3.84 3.70 0.33 1.92
Côte d'Ivoire 1 - - 1.23 0.50
6.29 1.63 8.91 2.36
Egypt 1 - 0.67 0.52 -
2.44 1.81 5.55 1.38
Gabon 1 - - 1.29 0.39
6.97 8.57 68.36 2.36
Gambia 1- - 0 . 7 7 -
0.42 2.51 1.91 0.34
Ghana 1 0.01 0.48 - -
0.85 2.79 4.99 2.33
Kenya 1 0.75 5.26 - -
3.52 5.92 4.51 3.26
Lesotho 1 - - - 0.33
0.36 2.86 5.18 3.60
Madagascar 1 - - 0.99 0.10
7.68 0.46 7.24 4.29
Morocco 1 - 3.82 - -
0.11 3.78 4.15 0.35
Niger 1 1.14 - 0.58 -
2.52 0.76 1.44 3.68
Rwanda 1 - - 0.31 0.25
3.68 1.86 0.54 1.55
Senegal 1- - 0 . 3 6 -
2.52 0.70 24.40 1.37
Sierra Leone 1 - - - 0.69
3.34 4.21 1.45 4.18
South Africa 1 - 0.56 0.48 -
0.20 1.61 10.93 3.47
Swaziland 1 0.22 0.54 2.22 -
0.57 0.93 11.00 2.2119
Appendix Table 8: Long-run equations, using FSD2
Notes:
1. PSAV is normalized to equal 1.
2. Figures in italics are t-values.
3. Lesotho is not included on account of lack of FSD2 data.
PSAV RGPDI GOVSAV PCRED FSD2
Botswana 1 3.24 - 8.69 4.75
7.33 2.08 21.90 2.68
Congo 1 1.62 - 167.12 1.19
4.69 3.85 0.41 2.42
Côte d'Ivoire 1 116.20 - - -
5.03 2.82 1.69 6.57
Egypt 1 0.19 37.65 29.42 -
0.31 6.72 11.11 9.01
Gabon 1 - - 0.85 0.34
11.79 4.46 8.76 1.20
Gambia 1 0.41 - 0.58 -
1.48 3.59 1.58 1.98
Ghana 1 ----
0.40 1.76 4.70 1.73
Kenya 1 - 1.68 1.15 -
4.89 4.35 3.49 4.04
Madagascar 1 - - 0.94 0.33
6.35 1.81 29.40 1.62
Morocco 1 - 1.95 - -
0.39 4.70 3.62 2.47
Niger 1 - - 1.53 0.01
4.22 2.64 3.09 0.04
Rwanda 1 - 6.23 - 8.51
7.62 7.20 16.52 9.16
Senegal 1 - 0.92 0.27 0.49
7.68 2.53 4.00 2.39
Sierra Leone 1 - - 1.77 0.02
2.64 2.27 4.07 0.08
South Africa 1 - - 0.00 0.55
15.78 2.50 0.10 9.56
Swaziland 1 - - 0.77 1.83
9.94 3.73 7.17 5.1120
Appendix Table 9: Long-run equations, using FSD3
Notes:
1. PSAV is normalized to equal 1.
2. Figures in italics are t-values.
PSAV RGPDI GOVSAV PCRED FSD3
Botswana 1 - 0.45 0.95 0.58
7.23 2.78 3.40 1.52
Congo 1 1.63 - 219.13 0.52
5.93 3.37 0.57 0.47
Côte d'Ivoire 1 - 10.46 - 18.38
2.07 8.89 9.38 7.63
Egypt 1 9.90 17.36 184.70 -
2.96 0.62 11.68 11.49
Gabon 1- - 4 . 5 7 -
7.08 11.27 74.77 7.39
Gambia 1 0.31 - 1.94 -
2.64 3.92 46.23 6.40
Ghana 1 ----
3.55 0.14 2.95 2.60
Kenya 1 - 1.09 0.76 -
4.06 2.14 1.96 2.65
Lesotho 1 0.38 - - 7.87
2.70 4.73 4.29 3.53
Madagascar 1 - - 0.75 0.39
8.00 0.76 10.23 2.01
Morocco 1 0.01 4.69 - -
0.18 3.23 1.48 1.41
Niger 1 - - 0.76 0.26
3.77 2.97 6.49 0.69
Rwanda 1 - 2.04 - 3.23
5.94 3.34 40.47 5.98
Senegal 1 - 1.10 0.23 0.32
13.48 3.80 4.25 3.82
Sierra Leone 1 - 0.58 1.91 -
2.07 3.40 5.94 4.76
South Africa 1 - 2.72 0.38 0.26
11.54 6.37 15.32 2.73
Swaziland 1 - 0.36 1.44 0.25
6.98 1.26 9.45 0.54